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On September 11, 2001, approximately 3,000 innocent people
were killed in terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New
York City and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. In response,
President George W. Bush declared, "[wie will make no distinction
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who
harbor them."1 Following the attacks, the United States determined
that Osama Bin Ladin and his Al Qaeda network were responsible for
the acts and ordered the Taliban, Afghanistan's ruling elite, turn over
terrorists within its borders. When the Taliban failed to comply with
the demand, the United States began a military campaign to destroy
Al Qaeda and to topple the regime that supported terrorism.
The United States had previously thought that it was protected
from terror by the oceans that isolate it. From this event, the world
has acknowledged that a well-funded terrorist organization can cause
substantial damage and unparalleled loss of life from a single attack.
The devastation that a terrorist organization can cause, through
financial contributions, tactical support, or weapons of mass
tJ.D., University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma, May 2004; B.A.,
Political Science, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, December 2000. The
author wishes to dedicate this comment to his parents, Michael and Norma Wiebe, for
their constant encouragement and inspiration. The author wishes to thank family
and friends for their support and understanding while writing this comment.
1.President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the
Nation (Sept.11, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases
2001/09/20010911-16.html.
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destruction, can no longer be ignored. The threat of state-sponsored
terror is very real.
'Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-nuclear, biological, and
chemical-in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent
one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States."
2
Several terrorist groups have expressed the desire to acquire weapons
of mass destruction; among such organizations, Bin Ladin and Al
Qaeda have stated that obtaining weapons of mass destruction is a
religious duty.' Such a risk may also be posed by North Korea, who
could sell weapons of mass destruction to terrorists in response to
4pressure from the United States to freeze its nuclear program.
Nations that have the capability to support and facilitate terrorism
exist, and the United States is now seriously debating the question of
whether to use assassination in anticipatory self-defense.
This comment will provide an investigation into the legality of
the assassination of state leaders that sponsor and harbor terrorists
under domestic and international law. It will primarily examine
domestic and international laws on assassination, and provide an
interpretation of how and when these laws apply. Section II will
discuss the definitions of assassination and terrorism, give a brief
historical background on the terms, and provide a short discussion on
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Section III will focus on the
domestic prohibition on assassination, namely Executive Order
12,333, Congressional investigation into past assassination attempts,
and increased oversight of the intelligence community. Section IV
will discuss the United Nations Charter and customary international
law's right to self-defense through preemptive assassination. Section
V will discuss moral and practical problems if the United States
employs assassination.
2. NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 1 (2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf.
3. OFFICE OF COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM-2002 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/
2002/html/19988.htm [hereinafter PATTERNS OF TERRORISM].
4. Richard Wolffe & B.J. Lee, Walking Into Trouble, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2003, at
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II. OVERVIEW OF ASSASSINATION, TERRORISM, AND THE CIA
A. Defining Assassination
Assassination is not a relatively new activity,5 yet scholars have
not been able to agree upon a definition of assassination." The
definition of assassination is as disputable as the action itself. It is
commonly believed that an assassination is a political murder;
however, the victim need not be a public official or one in a position of
political power.' An assassination may be committed against a
private person if the motive for the murder is based on a political9
reason. Depending on how one views the term "assassination," it
could include any intentional killing, or it could be defined as
including only those circumstances where a state leader is
murdered.'0 Major Tyler J. Harder, a Professor of Criminal Law in
the Judge Advocate General's School," concludes that an
assassination requires three elements: "(1) murder, (2) of a specifically
targeted figure, (3) for a political purpose. Absent any of these
elements, a killing is not an assassination."2
1. Peacetime Definition
The debate on the definition of assassination begins with whether
a nation is in a state of war. 3 W. Hays Parks, the Chief of the Army's
Law of War Branch of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, 4
defines a peacetime assassination as "the murder of a private
individual or public figure for political purposes, and in some cases...
also require[s] that the act constitute a covert activity, particularly
when the individual is a private citizen."'5 Thus, assassinating an
5. Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and
Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 613 (1992).
6. Id. at 611.
7. Daniel B. Pickard, Legalizing Assassination? Terrorism, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and International Law, 30 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 10 (2001).
8. W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and
Assassination, 1989 ARMY LAW. 4, 4 (1989).
9. Id.
10. Major Tyler J. Harder, Time to Repeal the Assassination Ban of Executive Order
12,333: A Small Step in Clarifying Current Law, 172 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002).
11. Id. at I n. 1.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Pickard, supra note 7, at 9.
14. Harder, supra note 10, at 5 n.25.
15. Parks, supra note 8, at 4.
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individual is illegal under international law,1 6 but international law
allows for a state to use self-defense to justify assassinations.17 The
United States has used force when a nation has perpetrated acts of
violence against its citizens when those acts emanated from within
another sovereign's borders.18 Thus, the decision to act against
terrorism in self-defense is no different than responding to a threat by
a sovereign nation." The difference is the source of the threat has
changed, but not the right of self-defense. ° When peacetime acts
amount to a threat to citizens' or national security, the United States
has used force to capture or kill those responsible. 2' An example is
the 1986 attacks on military targets including Colonel Qaddafi's




Michael N. Schmitt, a leading scholar on the law of
assassination , states the definition of wartime assassination is
comprised of two components: specific targeting of an individual, and
the use of treacherous means in killing the individual. 24 If the killing
does not contain both elements, the definition of assassination in
wartime is not met, and political motive is irrelevant because a killing
during the conflict is only motivated by furtherance of the country's
21interests. If a killing based on political motivation constituted
assassination during armed conflict, every death occurring in combat
would be an assassination.26  Schmitt then sets forth a list of
guidelines for assassination under the law of armed conflict:
treacherous killing of a specific individual is an assassination;
treachery involves the use of a false protected status or the use of a
bounty to facilitate the killing; falsely deceiving a victim into trusting
he is safe is probably treachery; the difference between combatant
16. Id.




21. Parks, supra note 8, at 7.
22. Lieutenant Commander Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed
Conflict, 134 MIL. L. REV. 123, 149 (1991).
23. Harder, supra note 10, at 4.
24. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 632.
25. Id. at 639.
26. Id.
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and non-combatant does not determine if the killing is an
assassination; the use of a specific weapon does not make an act an
assassination; and necessity and proportionality (to be discussed
later) apply to targeting individuals, but a violation of one does not
constitute assassination.
B. Early Commentators
Assassination is believed to have originated from the term
"Hashish" which was used by Hasan-Dan-Sabah to incite mercenaries
to commit murders for political reasons while in a drugged state.28
The Bible describes assassination, Greco-Roman worlds dealt with the
issue, and those in the Middle Ages frequently practiced such
29activity. Scholars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
began the discussion on the appropriateness of assassination in the
scope of war.0 The focus on assassination by the early scholars was
that a leader was not absolutely protected; he may be killed as long as
the leader was not treacherously attacked.31  Early scholars
questioned the morality of assassination and addressed the obligation
of people to assassinate unsavory leaders. 32  The writers who
discussed assassinating undesirable leaders asserted that before
resorting to violence, the actors needed to find it was impossible to
remove the leader but for the use of assassination. These writings
have provided the basis for modern restrictions on the use of
assassination.34 Thus, understanding the view of early scholars will
help to illustrate the modern views on assassination.35
St. Thomas Aquinas acknowledged that violence against the
sovereign should be applied when necessary to save the innocent from
death and to punish those authorizing the use of war.3 Similarly, Sir
Thomas More proclaimed that one who killed an opposing king should
27. Id. at 641-42.
28. JorHN JAcOB NUTTER, THE CIA's BLACK OPS: COVERT ACTION, FOREIGN POLICY,
AND DEMOCRACY 127-28 (2000).
29. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 613.
30. Zengel, supra note 22, at 125.
31. Pickard, supra note 7, at 14.
32. MURRAY CLARK HAVENS ET AL., TEE POLITICS OF ASSASSINATION 6 (1970).
33. Id.
34. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 613.
35. Id.
36. Thomas C. Wingfield, Taking Aim at Regime Elites: Assassination, Tyrannicide,
and the Clancy Doctrine, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 287, 295 (1998).
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receive huge rewards." Under this view, "it's extremely sensible to
dispose of major wars like this without fighting a single battle, and
also most humane to save thousands of innocent lives at the cost of a
few guilty ones." 8 More speaks to the damage caused by a nation that
allows a tyrant to take power. Though citizens may have failed to
oppose the rise of a tyrannical dictator, subsequent generations
should not be responsible for the tyrant's acts. 9 Once a dictator has
gained power, his interest is in keeping that power by whatever
means necessary; thus, other nations may levy sanctions against the
regime, causing the population, not the dictator, to suffer.4°
Balthazar Ayala moved from the necessity of assassination to the
methods used in the killing. "Ayala commended St. Augustine's
opinion 'it is indifferent from the standpoint of justice whether
trickery be used' in assassinating the enemy, he was quick to
distinguish trickery from 'frauds and snares.' This exception survives
in present legal codes as the ruse-perfidy distinction."41 Alberico
Gentili furthered the ruse-perfidy distinction 42 by stating that a
treacherous murder was completely void of justice and honor, and
rejected More's utilitarian standard that assassinating a leader would
save many lives. 43  Gentili believed that the utilitarian approach
would not pass muster.
[Elven what he sets forth about utility is uncertain; for will there
be no successor to the deceased prince? Will not his citizens throw
themselves into war with the more energy because of that new
wrong, signal and shameful as it is? We shall hear that soldiers are
roused to frenzy when their leader is slain by no illegitimate
44
means.
37. Id. (construing SIR THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA, 111 (Paul Turner trans., Penguin
Books 1965)).
38. MORE, supra note 37, at 111.
39. Wingfield, supra note 36, at 297-98.
40. Id. at 298.
41. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 614 (construing BALTHAZAR AYALA, THREE BOOKS ON
THE LAW OF WAR AND ON THE DUTIES CONNECTED WITH WAR AND ON MILITARY
DISCIPLINE 84 (John Pawley Bate trans., Carnegie Institution 1964)).
42. Wingfield, supra note 36, at 299.
43. Zengel, supra note 22, at 126 (construing ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI
TRES (1692), reprinted in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (John C. Rolfe
trans., 1964)).
44. THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 167.
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He also believed treachery was a violation of natural law, and
refused to use the means of treachery to kill a man.45
Hugo Grotius differentiated between "assassins who violate an
express or tacit obligation of good faith, such as subjects against a
king, soldiers against superiors, or suppliants, strangers or deserters
against those who have received them, and assassins who have no
such obligation. '4 6  Grotius denounced killing by treachery or
treacherous means, but stated it was permissible to kill an enemy at
any place and any time under natural and civilized law.47 He believed
that the prohibition on treacherous assassinations was to be followed
during times of war against a sovereign enemy, but allowed treachery
to be used to wage war against pirates, robbers, and others who were
481
not sovereigns.
Emmerich de Vattel described assassination as "a murder
committed by means of treachery." 9 Vattel declared that the killing
of an enemy leader is not always illegal, but the methods used in the
killing would determine if the act were illegal.50 He emphasized
necessity in the killing of an enemy leader.5' He believed that a right
to kill an enemy leader without treachery existed, but assassination
was only to be employed when other strategies would not be
sufficient.5' Factors considered by Vattel were the scope of the conflict
and the state's reasons for assassinating the enemy leader in
considering necessity.13 He could not approve of killing an enemy
leader when necessity did not compel it; a threat to state sovereignty
was needed to necessitate the killing when the conflict could be
settled without such an injury to the state.
4
45. Id. at 168.
46. Zengel, supra note 22, at 127 (construing HuGo GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac
PACiS LIBRI TRES, reprinted in 2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 653-654
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1964)).
47. Id.
48. Id. (construing GROTIUS, supra note 46, at 633).
49. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS, 288
(Charles Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution 1964).




54. VArEL, supra note 49, at 290.
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Lieutenant Commander Patricia Zengel, a United States Navy
Judge Advocate,55 states:
The consensus of these early commentators was that an attack
directed at an enemy, including an enemy leader, with the intent of
killing him or her was generally permissible, but not if the attack
was a treacherous one. Treachery was defined as betrayal by one
owing an obligation of good faith to the intended victim.56
The commentator's writings on personal attacks by an enemy
generally focus on honorable warfare and the need to protect
sovereign leaders that are possible targets for assassination. This
view of the preservation of honorable warfare58 does not correspond
with the threats present in the contemporary world.
C. Terrorism Defined
The word "terrorism" emanates from the French Revolution,
during which time the regime de la terreur was formed as a method to
restore public order following the events of 1789.' 9 As with the
definition of assassination, scholars have failed to find an appropriate
definition of terrorism that encompasses the many forms of
terrorism.6' The failure to define the term and to clarify who is a
terrorist stems from political goals that differ between states, as well
as religious and ideological differences.6' Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §
2656(a), the Department of State defines terrorism as: "premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended
to influence an audience."
6 2
55. Zengel, supra note 22, at 123.
56. Id. at 130.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 125.
59. BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 15 (1998).
60. Pickard, supra note 7, at 4.
61. RICHARD J. ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-
SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 26 (1989). Often "one state's 'terrorist' is
another state's 'freedom fighter."' United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime,
Definitions of Terrorism, at http://www.unodc.org/unod/terrorism-definitions.html
(last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
62. OFFICE OF COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORIsM-2002 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/
2002/html/19977.htm. The Department of State further defines international
terrorism as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country."
Id. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as "[tihe unlawful use of
370 [Vol. 11.1
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A state can be involved in terrorism at four levels. 3 First, state
inaction involves a situation where terrorists operate within a state's
sovereign territory, but the state does not have the resources toS • 64
combat the terrorist organization. Second, state toleration is when a
force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social goals."
COUNTERTERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT AND WARNING UNIT NATIONAL SECURED
DIVISION, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1996). The FBI defines international
terrorism as:
the unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or
individual, who has some connection to a foreign power or whose
activities transcend national boundaries, against persons or property
to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. Id.
The United Nations language:
1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as
criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed;
2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a
state of terror in the general public, a group or persons or particular
persons for political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable,
whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological,
racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify
them. G.A. Res. 57/27, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/57/27 (2003).
Terrorism expert A.P. Schmid in 1992 proposed in a report to the UN Crime Branch
that "[i]f the core of war crimes -deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage taking and
the killing of prisoners-is extended to peacetime, we could simply define acts of
terrorism as 'peacetime equivalents of war crimes."' United Nations Office of Drugs
and Crime, Definitions of Terrorism, at http://www.unodc.orglunodc/
terrorism-Aefinitions.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
Schmid has academically defined terrorism as:
an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by
(semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic,
criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination -
the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The
immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic
targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.
Threat - and violence based communication processes between
terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are
used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a
target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention,
depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is
primarily sought. Id.
63. See ERICKSON, supra note 61, at 32.
64. Id. at 33.
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nation recognizes that a terrorist organization exists within its
borders and takes a neutral stance by neither supporting nor
expelling the threat.65 Third, actual state support occurs when a
nation uses its resources to supply the organization with aid, but is
not directly involved in the decision-making operations of the terrorist
organization.66 The fourth and highest level of state involvement is
state sponsorship.67 This occurs when a state employs tactics of terror
as an extension of war to gain some advantage by the use of
61
unconventional means.
States have rights and responsibilities similar to individuals, as
well as obligations to other States, but frequently these
responsibilities are ignored. 9  States have the responsibility under
international law to avoid assistance and involvement in terrorist acts
directed at a second state.7' Every state has an obligation to subdue
those within its territorial borders and to ensure individuals do not
use the state's territory to engage in criminal activity against other
states.71 The state is liable for the actions or inactions of officials and
agents representing the state, with the acts of the state leaders
imputable directly to the state. 72 State-sponsored terrorism allows a
state to act through surrogates to attack their enemies while evading
responsibility and retaliation." However, states choose not to fulfill
those obligations by failing to enforce their domestic law against
terrorists, but actually train and support such groups.74 Iraq, Iran,
and Libya are considered "rogue states" because of their alleged
• 71
support of international terrorism. When a nation does not comply
65. Id.
66. Id. The resources may include: "training, arms, explosives, equipment,
intelligence, safe havens, communications, travel documents, financing, or other
logistical support." Id.
67. Id. at 32.
68. ERICKSON, supra note 61, at 32.
69. Id. at 96.
70. Id. at 97.
71. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International
Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 106 (1989).
72. ERICKSON, supra note 61, at 99.
73. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 94-95.
74. Id. at 92.
75. Pickard, supra note 7, at 5. The United States Department of State in 2002
designated seven state sponsors of terrorism: Sudan, Syria, North Korea, Iran, Iraq,
Cuba, and Libya. PATTERNS OF TERRORISM, supra note 3. The United States
Government imposes four restrictions on such states:
1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.
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with these obligations, other countries are forced to violate the
territorial integrity of the non-compliant State.5
The use of violence against a terrorist organization is a
controversial issue, but is even further complicated when the leader of
a state is actively involved in supporting or participating in
international terrorism.77 Assassination of the leader may be legal
when a state leader supports or facilitates terrorist groups by
allowing the use of state resources for employing illegal acts of
violence against other states; in these situations, the activity of the
terrorist can be linked to the sovereign leader.7 ' Advocates of state-
sponsored terrorism should not be treated as criminals, but rather as
proponents against the United States' national security.79  It is
believed that by taking swift and stern measures, such as the use of
preemptive force, self-defense will deter against future acts and
support of terrorism.' The right of assassination would stem from
the principle of self-defense and preemption.81
2. Controls over exports of dual use items, requiring 30 day
Congressional notification for goods or services that could
significantly enhance the terrorist list country's military capability or
ability to support terrorism.
3. Prohibitions on economic assistance.
4. Impositions of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions,
including:
" Requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank
and other international financial institutions.
" Lifting the diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist
victims to file civil lawsuits is US courts.
" Denying companies and individuals tax credits for income
earned in terrorist list countries.
" Denial of duty-free treatment for goods exported to the United
States.
" Authority to prohibit any US person from engaging in a
financial transaction with a terrorist list government without a
Treasury Department license.
" Prohibition of Defense Department contracts above $100,000
with companies controlled by terrorist list states. Id.
76. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 106-07.
77. Pickard, supra note 7, at 6.
78. Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During
Peace and War, 5 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 231, 248 (1992).
79. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 90.
80. Id. at 95.
81. Beres, supra note 78, at 248.
373
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D. An Overview of the CIA
As a result of World War II, the Office of Strategic Services was
created as an intelligence organization designed to provide1 2
intelligence analysis and covert operations. However, the program
ended after the war.83 Following the National Security Act of 1947,
the CIA was created and became the primary institution forS 84
intelligence gathering and covert action. The CIA's activities are
organized by the Director of Central Intelligence, who is responsible
to the President as the head of the intelligence community.88 The CIA
is divided into four branches. The pertinant branch is the Directorate
of Operations, or clandestine services, which is responsible for covert
operations, and would be the group responsible for assassinations of
• 86
terrorists. A proposal for covert action is filtered through several
subgroups of the CIA. The operations are prepared by the Covert
Action Planning Group, composed of senior officials who are
responsible for covert action implementation. The plan is sent back up
to CIA top echelon, to the Director of Central Intelligence, and
ultimately back to the President for approval.8 7 The President has the
ability to direct the CIA to conduct operations that further national
security, which has been understood to include covert operations
within the borders of foreign nations and the employment of the use of
violence.8 Under Presidential authority and a concurrent finding by
Congress, a covert operation would not be illegal under domestic law
if it involved the killing of a foreign leader or terrorist.88 The Report
by the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, responding to current
and future objectives of the intelligence community, has stated
militant nationalism and transnational terrorism provide uncertain
situations and clear threats to national security.90 The report has also
advised for further intelligence gathering against rogue states such as
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.91
82. JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 16-17 (4th ed. 1999).
83. Id. at 17.
84. Id. at 17-18.
85. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403(a) (West Supp. 2002).
86. Pickard, supra note 7, at 28.
87. RICHELSON, supra note 82, at 419.
88. Zengel, supra note 22, at 146.
89. Id.
90. AULAN E. GOODMAN ET AL., IN FROM THE COLD: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE 56 (1996).
91. Id.
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III. DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Church Committee
In 1975, the United States Senate, led by Frank Church, began
exploring the intelligence community's operations in alleged
assassination plots.9 By the end of the year, the Church Committee
issued its findings in Alleged Assassination Plots Against Foreign
Leaders,93 which reported United States involvement in five
assassinations or attempts to assassinate foreign leaders since 1960.94
The Committee determined its role in the investigations was not to
act as a court, but rather to gain knowledge on past involvement in
assassinations and to provide advice for future use of covert
operations.9'
Four of the attempted assassinations intended to eliminate
foreign leaders already in power, and the other attempt was to thwart
a leader from taking power.96 The Church Committee could not
definitively report that former United States Presidents or other
officials directed the assassinations or attempted assassinations, but
did determine officials had not eliminated the use of assassination as
a viable option.9' Furthermore, the report stated there was some
indirect involvement by United States officials. 98 In coming to its
conclusions, the committee used a large volume of records including
8,000 pages of testimony gathered from over seventy-five witnesses
during sixty days of hearings. 99 The Committee also based its findings
and conclusions on the United States involvement in the five plots to
assassinate foreign leaders. 00
Its findings and conclusions were clear: "short of war,
assassination is incompatible with American principles, international
order, and morality. It should be rejected as a tool of foreign policy."'01
92. U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, ALLEGED
ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. No. 94-465, at 1 (1975),
available at http://www.history-matters.com/archive/church/reports/ir/contents.htm
(last visited Oct. 2, 2003) [hereinafter CHURCH REPORT].
93. JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 595-96 (1987).
94. Zengel, supra note 22, at 141.
95. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 92, at 255.
96. Zengel, supra note 22, at 141.
97. RANELAGH, supra note 93, at 596.
98. Zengel, supra note 22, at 141-42.
99. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 92, at 2.
100. Id. at 4.
101. Id. at 1.
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The Committee was seriously concerned with the communication
breakdown within the structure of the CIA and the intelligence
community. °2 The agents involved in covert actions did not have
knowledge of operational limitations, and their superiors did not
communicate the boundaries of constraints on assassination.
03
The Committee also expressed great concern over the origin of
authorization by United States officials to conduct covert activities
involving assassination,1 0 4 and was frustrated with the inability to
ascertain where the authority to involve the United States in
attempted assassinations emanated.0 5  The continued use of
"plausible deniability," or the use of ambiguous and general language
by government officials when discussing covert operations, led to a
lack of accountability within the government as to the origin of
authorization. 06  The goal of plausible deniability is to conduct
activities in secret and avoid the disclosure of involvement by the
United States.1°7 The Committee found sufficient evidence that the
doctrine of plausible deniability used to prevent disclosure of covert
activities was adopted to protect the decisions of the President and
other officials.0 8 Deniability is key in assassination plots because the
knowledge of involvement can seriously hamper relations with other
governments.'0 9 The Committee concluded when the decisions of
officials are to remain secret, the result is a substantial increase in
careless action on behalf of these officials."0
The Committee explained that several complications might arise
when determining the possibility of assassinations of foreign leaders.
These include: political instability of foreign governments as a result
of assassination leading to more problematic issues with the new
successor; failure of democracies to provide that the assassination will
remain secret; the possibility that the assassination would lead to a
response of assassination attempts against American leaders,"' and
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resentment by the population of the foreign nation if a popular leader
is killed. Furthermore, it also explained that the assassinations
occurred during the historical backdrop of the Cold War, in which
communism was perceived as a threat and these leaders were
considered a danger to national security. 1 3 The Committee concluded
that only Castro was seen as a threat to the interests of the United
States, and he was then only a threat during the Cuban Missile
Crisis."' The report indicated that if an individual leader might pose
an imminent threat to the United States, that leader might be
targeted for assassination. '
The Committee reached an understanding of two differences in
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regards to plots to overthrow foreign governments. First,
assassination plots conceived by the United States are fundamentally
different than those in which a foreign population petitions the
United States for assistance."' Second, assassination plots in which
the goal was the death of a foreign leader were distinguished from
plots in which the leader's death was indirect and not a reasonably
foreseeable possibility.18 The Committee stated there was a markedly
different objective between intentionally targeting an individual for
death and becoming involved in the overthrow of a government." 9
The report expressly stated that the targeting of an individual for
death should not be allowed," ° but allowed that when coups occur,
there is a possibility that the leader will be assassinated.12' "This
country was created by violent revolt against a regime believed to be
tyrannous, and our founding fathers (the local dissidents of that era)
received aid from foreign countries. Given that history, we should not
today rule out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow
tyrants."122 The following are the five cases of assassination plots
studied by the Church Committee.
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1. Congo and Patrice Lumumba
Patrice Lumumba became the Premier of the newly independent
Congo amidst a revolution in the summer of 1960.123 When Lumumba
declared aid would be received from any nation in order to maintain
the economy of the Congo, United States officials determined that
Lumumba was looking to the Soviet Union for economic help. 24 The
CIA then began communicating with several individuals to become
part of Lumumba's entourage, and discussed the use of poisons that
could be introduced into his food or toothpaste. 12' The plans to kill
Lumumba were not finished and it was found that the CIA had no
involvement in his death;126 instead, another rival within the Congokilled him. 27
2. Cuba and Fidel Castro
The Church Committee found evidence that the CIA plotted to
assassinate Fidel Castro at least eight times from 1960 to 1965."2 It
found that several plots involved the use of sniper rifles, toxic pills
and pens, and other inventive schemes. 129 Many of the plots did not
escalate beyond preparation to assassinate the leader; however, it was
found that one plot involved the use of toxic pills and authorized to
proceed with the plan to assassinate Castro. 30 Upon Castro's seizing
power, the United States did not originally employ the use of
assassination to undermine the Cuban leader.' The plot involved
the introduction of a drug similar to LSD to Castro's cigars, in an
attempt to undermine his authority by causing him to hallucinate
during his address to the nation."12  An attempt was made by
members of the mafia, with assistance from the CIA, to have a Cuban
official who owed gambling debts to the mafia place poison pills in
Castro's drink.'1
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Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA began
to intensify its efforts to assassinate Castro. President Kennedy
initiated Operation Mongoose giving the instruction that the CIA was
to create and execute schemes to remove Castro from power,
indicating that killing Castro was a viable option.'3 ' The CIA
proposed that Operation Mongoose work with Cuban exiles and use
them to overthrow Castro instead of the United States using direct
action. 1 6 Operation Mongoose devised thirty-three plans to "remove"
Castro from power, which ranged from a biological attack on Cubans
crops, to circulating rumors among the large Roman Catholic
population that Christ would return to Cuba on the condition that
Castro was removed from power.137 Despite the numerous efforts to
plot and attempt to assassinate Castro, the efforts by the CIA failed. 3
3. Dominican Republic and Rafael Trujillo
By 1960, President Eisenhower considered Rafael Trujillo, a
candidate for the Presidency of Dominican Republic, a threat to the
United States and assassination plans were developed.' The plots
were not carried out because President Kennedy took office in 1961.140
The Church Committee found that a rival faction of Dominican
officials assassinated Trujillo in 1961, despite direct evidence of the
United States involvement through arms support.'4 1 The United
States had knowledge of the assassination plot and supported the
overthrow of Trujillo because of the fear that Trujillo's political
ideology would lead to a communist revolution in the Dominican
Republic. 42 The Committee never determined whether the guns used
in Trujillo's assassination were supplied by the United States to the
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4. South Vietnam and Ngo Dinh Diem
The President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, was
assassinated in an apparent coup led by Vietnamese generals in
November 1963.144 The Committee determined the military coup was
in reaction to Diem not resigning or turning himself over to the
custody of the military leaders. 145 The Committee found evidence that
the United States supported the coup but was not involved in the
assassination.14r The United States became increasingly frustrated
with the Diem regime 147 for an incident involving South Vietnamese
troops shooting and killing nine Buddhists and wounding fourteen
others, and for failing to comply with the United States to restore
confidence in the Vietnamese Government. 14 A CIA officer in Saigon
contacted one of the individuals involved in the coup who asked for
United States backing if the coup succeeded. 149 Of the three options
proposed by the coup, the officer responded by cable to Washington
that the United States should not take a definitive stance against the
assassination of Diem because the other two options would involve
revolt and numerous casualties in Vietnam.
50
5. Chile and General Rene Schneider
Salvador Allende received a plurality of votes in the election for
the Chilean Presidency in 1970 1' and due to a constitutional
requirement, the Chilean Congress was to elect the next President.
52
The United States saw Allende's election as President as a threat of
the spread of communism.5 5 Allende was the first communist
democratically elected to the Chilean Presidency, and the problem
was whether the CIA should support a military coup against a nation
that possessed a working democracy."4  The Chilean military
commander, General Rene Schneider, was a devout believer in
democracy and would protect the constitution against action to
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prevent Allende from taking power. President Nixon authorized the
CIA to become involved in the development of a coup to prevent
Allende's election as President.' 56 Schneider could not be convinced to
retire or step down, and thus the removal of Schneider became
paramount in proceeding with the coup.' 7 On October 22, Schneider
was intercepted by the plotters, shot, and killed 5 ' The Church
Committee concluded that Chilean officials other than those who
received weapons from the CIA executed the assassination of
Schneider.
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Following the investigations, the Committee stated that
legislation should be enacted to make assassination, attempted
assassination, or conspiracy to assassinate a foreign leader a criminal
offense for those under the jurisdiction of the United States, unless
the United States has declared war or is conducting a military
operation under the War Powers Act.' 6 Congress was never able to
enact legislation prohibiting assassination; as a result, it is believed a
President may decide to use assassination as an instrument of foreign
policy.' 16 ' This failure to enact legislation can also be seen as
Congress' unwillingness to legislate on a highly disputed issue.
B. Executive Order 12,333
While the Church Committee conducted hearings into alleged
assassination plots, President Ford publicly stated his administration
would refuse to use assassination as a tool of foreign policy. 162 In 1976
Ford signed Executive Order 11,905, which declared "[n]o employee of
the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage
in, political assassination.' ' 63 The subsequent two Presidents also
signed similar executive orders with little change to Ford's Order
11,905. 16 President Carter's Executive Order 12,306 furthered the
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prohibition of assassination by assigning culpability to those who
engage in assassination plots in the name of the United States, and
eliminated the word "political" which was used as a qualifying term to
assassination. 165 Executive Order 12,333 expressly states, "No person
employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government
shall engage in, or conspire to engage in assassination." 6  The
provision immediately following the prohibition also provides that no
intelligence agency can engage in or recruit the involvement of any
other person to participate in activities that are prohibited by the
Order. 16 7  The slight modification of Carter's Order by President
Reagan now states that no agency is allowed to participate in any
enterprise which is prohibited by the Order.
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Executive Order 12,333 states the objectives and the elements
which regulate the intelligence community in providing for national
security. 6 9 The Order, while providing a framework from which the
intelligence community is to operate, does not give a working
definition or an acceptable declaration of what constitutes an
assassination.17 In Executive Order 12,333, paragraph 3.4 provides
for definitions to be used in the Order, and the term "assassination" is
not listed. 17' By failing to include the definition of assassination, the
assassination ban should be applied in circumstances analogous to
the five cases studied by the Church Committee. 7 The circumstances
apply to times in which the United States is at peace and an agency of
the intelligence community is involved in the death of foreign leaders
because their political ideology could cause harm to the United States
either domestically or abroad.1
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It is argued the Order's failure to define or state what is meant by
assassination was deliberate. 74 The debate over the vague use of
"assassination" in Order 12,333 has been interpreted more
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20031 ASSASSINATION IN DOMESTIC & INT'L LAW 383
restrictively than what was proposed by the Church Committee, and
more restrictively than the prohibition of assassination under
international law.'75 The Executive Order's failure to provide a
precise definition is believed to be of great benefit to the United States
because foreign regimes are unable to determine precisely what action
the United States will take in response to serious provocation. 7 6 In
failing to define assassination precisely, President Ford and
subsequent Presidents have reserved to the executive branch the
debate over restrictions on assassinations, and have prevented more
restrictive legislation proposed by Congress through appeasement by
the executive orders.
77
The Executive Order issued by Ford also serves to illustrate the
President may repeal or modify the order, but Congress declared such
action is available to Congress as well.78 Congress' failure to enact
legislation prohibiting assassination may be interpreted as Congress
impliedly reserving to the President the power to revoke the
Executive Order and use assassination as an option in foreign
policy. 179 The President has the authority to direct the CIA to conduct
covert activities which pertain to the operations needed to protect
national security. ' 80 Further measures instituted by Congress on
oversight of covert operations do not seriously impede the President's
ability to conduct covert activities because they are more procedural
than substantive."" It would not be illegal under United States law if
a President authorized covert activities to assassinate a foreign leader
to further national security, if it was determined by the President
such action was necessary and he made a proper showing to
Congress.' 8 This action by the President would have the effect of a
revocation of Executive Order 12,333.18' The Order in effect declares
that the use of assassination as a policy option is invested only with
the President, and others who engage in such conduct do so in
violation of the prohibition on assassination. T 4 The Order further
175. Id.
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accomplishes a goal of the Church Committee, restricting the exercise
of plausible denial within the government .
C. Congressional Action and Reform of the CIA
The result of the Church Committee's investigation into the
involvement of the United States in assassination attempts was not to
hamper how the CIA works, but to restore credibility to the agency by
exposing and removing those who could not operate within the
acceptable principles of the government. 186  With Congressional
oversight, Congress concedes that the United States must continue to
use covert action when needed. 18 7 Legislators were alarmed at the
frequency with which the "intelligence agencies had violated their
laws and charters.".. Congress made attempts for reforms to bring
accountability to the intelligence community beginning in 1974. l89
Congress enacted the Hughes-Ryan Amendment in 1974, which
made two major changes in the use of covert activities.1 90 First, for
the President to have authority to begin a covert action, he would
have to gain approval through a finding.' 9' The finding had to be
presented to the necessary committees within Congress in a timely
fashion and Congress had to be provided with the information that
the White House had undertaken a covert operation. 1 2 By enacting
such legislation, Congress did not provide itself with the authority to
grant or disapprove covert actions, but provided the opportunity to
alert the President as to its displeasure of an action, or withhold
funds for a project if the objective was outrageous. 92 The Senate and
the House founded new committees in 1976 to oversee the intelligence
community and manage the budget of the intelligence agencies.194 As
a result of monitoring executive action, Congress is an active
participant in oversight of the intelligence community. 95 Congress
185. Zengel, supra note 22, at 147.
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legitimizes any covert action that comes to its knowledge through the
oversight committees.
196
Kathryn Olmsted, an author of a study of intelligence
accountability, has sharply criticized Congress' failure to properly
oversee the intelligence community by allowing the intelligence
agencies to remain at status quo rather than provide more heightened
standards of accountability. 97 Loch K. Johnson, a Regents Professor
of Political Science at the University of Georgia, 98 disagrees with
Olmsted and states that Congress has been more influential on the
intelligence community by creating oversight committees and
managing their operations rather than passing numerous laws to
control the CIA. 99 However, some legislation, such as the Intelligence
Oversight Act of 1980, provides for more accountability to Congress by
requiring prior notice of each significant covert operation. '0 The
Intelligence Act of 1991 further enhances accountability by requiring
an advanced written finding by the President for substantial covert
operations.2 0' It provides:
Each finding shall be in writing, unless immediate action by the
United States is required and time does not permit the preparation
of a written finding, in which case a written record of the
President's decisions shall be contemporaneously made and shall
be reduced to a written finding as soon as possible but in no event
more than 48 hours after the decision is made.20 2
The overall effect of legislation designed to oversee the
intelligence community following the Cold War has been that
Congress and the President have created a partnership in approving
and conducting intelligence operations, as compared to virtually non-
existent Congressional involvement in 1975 prior to the Church
Committee investigations.0 3
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1. The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force
The Report by the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force concluded
that despite legislation to modernize the intelligence community,
there is still a need for more centralization.0 4 The Task Force
recommends more guidance regarding intelligence collection and
stabilizing leadership. Moreover, the Task Force suggests the goals of
the agencies need to be properly identified, and congressional
oversight needs to be defined. 05  The problems that confront the
reorganization of the intelligence community include finding ways to
improve an adverse view of the intelligence by the population,
mending the lack of trust by congressional oversight committees, and
modifying intelligence activities in a new global world.2 6  Further,
there are new threats to the security of the United States that may
not be attributable to a single nation; these threats concern multi-
217
national terrorism and crime organizations.
IV. ASSASSINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
When the United States considers the use of assassination, it
must not only apply domestic law, but it must also apply international
law. International law is derived from treaty law and customary law,
which prescribes the conduct of states and the relations between
them. °8
In response to the terrorist attack on the United States on
September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush reacted by declaring
war on the terrorists responsible for the attacks and the nations that
allowed them to exist within their borders.0 9 William O'Brien, a
Professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown
University, also states terrorists must be attacked and the
governments responsible for harboring terrorist groups must be
punished to deter or end future support.210 State-sponsored terrorism
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386 [Vol. 11.1
2003] ASSASSINATION IN DOMESTIC & INT'L LAW
is an act of war for which a response of force is clearly justified."' The
moral questions to be discussed when deciding to use force in
response to terrorism should not be any different than when
determining to use force against an overt act of hostility."'
A. State-Sponsored Terrorism as Armed Conflict
When the law of armed conflict governs depends on whether the
hostilities amount to a level of "armed conflict" and whether the
conflict is international or internal. 13  Emanuel Gross, a Professor
and member of the Faculty of Law at Haifa University, 24 states the
attacks on September 11, 2001, were perceived as an "act of war"
entitling the United States to use self-defense; NATO and other states
recognized this right and agreed to help the campaign against
terrorism. 2  He concludes the attacks against the United States are
not a conventional war, but are not a situation of peace either; the
circumstances are seen as armed conflict allowing for self-defense. 21s
The United States, exercising this right of self-defense, began its
campaign against Al Qaeda and countries that supported and gave
safe haven to the group.1 7
The United States holds to the theory that "the law of armed
conflict governs hostilities regardless of the characterization of the
conflict."28 "When targeting a specific individual is based on a valid
exercise of self-defense, killing that individual will rarely be
considered assassination, regardless of the applicable law governing
assassination. The international law of armed conflict will likely be
deemed applicable." 19 Thus, actions allowing an application of United
CONSTRAINTS ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT 181, 197 (Alberto R. Coll et al. eds., 1995).
See id. at 201.
211. James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and Low Intensity Conflict, in 67
INTERNATIONAL LAw STUDIES: LEGAL AND MORAL CONSTRAINTS ON LOW-INTENSITY
CONFLICT 147, 161 (Alberto R. Coll et al. eds., 1995).
212. Id. at 162.
213. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 642.
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216. Id. at 208. Gross states that the nation of Israel is in an armed conflict and
reacts in self-defense in response to terrorism, and he provides the United States is in
a parallel situation allowing for the use of self-defense. Id.
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387
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
Nations Charter Article 51 would amount to armed conflict. 22° When
the hostilities rise to the status of armed conflict, the criterion of
political motivation is no longer applicable, and treachery becomes the
221issue as to whether the killing is an assassination.
1. Treachery
Treachery is seen as a breach of confidence; thus, treachery
would include an attack on a targeted individual who justifiably
believes there is no need to fear the attacker. 2  The prohibition
against treachery does not include an enemy placing a bomb in a
leader's compound, or using sniper tactics to kill a victim from a
concealed location.223 An assassination can never be found to exist by
the use of surprise alone because an enemy combatant may not
assume that prior notice is needed for an attack.. Wearing civilian
clothes to kill enemy leaders during armed conflict may not be
225deemed an assassination because of state practice. It is argued that
wearing the uniform of the enemy to travel to the assassination
location is legitimate, but would be treacherous if the assassination
occurs while dressed in enemy uniform.226 Similarly, the wearing of
civilian clothes to the target's location is not treacherous, because the
target's confidence is not breached, but becomes treacherous if in
order to move on the target the assassin dresses as a civilian in the
crowd to feign that he is a noncombatant. To determine if
assassination of state leaders that support terrorism is acceptable
under international law, assassinations must be examined under the
right of self-defense.
B. Customary International Law
Under customary law, the right of self-defense emerges from the
Caroline incident proposed by Secretary of State Daniel Webster in
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 633.
223. Id. at 634.
224. Parks, supra note 8, at 5.
225. Id. at 6 and n.3. Parks states an example: "During World War II, a British
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Id. at 6. If captured, the officer would have been tried and upon conviction executed
as a spy. Id. at n.3.
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227. Id. at 638.
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the nineteenth century. In 1837, a Canadian uprising was
supported by United States citizens operating outside the United
States' borders. 9 The steamer "Caroline" smuggled people and
weapons into Canada, and United States authorities failed to curtail
•• 230
the actions. The British caught and burned the ship in the
territorial waters of the United States, resulting in the death of two
people.231  During diplomatic correspondence between the United
States Government and Great Britain, Webster argued the theory for
212
self-defense in which an actual attack is not required. Webster
stated, "self-defense should be confined to cases in which the necessity
of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation."
2 33
Customary law allows self-defense against all acts of aggression,
which includes state support to terrorists by host states and providing
the terrorists with safe haven-treaty law allows self-defense only
when armed attack occurs. 34 The United States provides that the
right to self-defense may be applied against any illegal aggression,
which may come from any group or state is found responsible for the
illegal use of force.23 It has been advanced that if terrorist attacks
are not isolated acts, but are continuous, the attacks will be perceived
as armed attacks.236 The United States was attacked by terrorists
who promised aggression would continue, and under customary
international law, a state supporting terrorists may be subject to a
preemptive attack to prevent future aggression.237 To satisfy self-
228. Id. at 646-47.
229. Gross, supra note 208, at 210. See Robert F. Teplitz, Note, Taking Assassination
Attempts Seriously: Did the United States Violate International Law in Forcefully
Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569, 574
(1995).
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233. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 647 (citing Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord
Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in JOHN B. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
412 (1906)).
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235. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 93.
236. Gross, supra note 208, at 215.
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defense the Caroline Doctrine requires three elements: imminence,
necessity, and proportionality.3 8
1. Self-Defense Requirement of Imminence
Imminence is a component of self-defense limited by time. 2' 9
When defensive actions appear less successful in repelling the
aggression, the recognition of the use of a preemptive strike
241increases. If the threat increases, the preemptive measures
intensify, creating a greater justification for preemptive attack before
the aggressor can strike.24' This reasoning collapses when analyzed
against a threat such as terrorism, because the United States is
242stronger than a terrorist group. By waiting until the last moment
to respond, the United States demonstrates a willingness to use
violence as a last resort. 1 3  This analysis is further complicated
because of the unpredictable nature of terrorist attacks.244 By waiting
too long to respond, a state loses the opportunity for self-defense;
thus, when a state responds, it should be taken into context if the
response occurred within the last possible window of opportunity."'
Therefore, the timing of the preemptive strike, and not the imminence
of the attack, should be the standard in evaluating if the response was
anticipatory.246
2. Self-Defense Requirement of Necessity
Necessity is a key component when exercising self-defense.
2 47
Richard J. Erickson, a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air
Force, 248 states necessity becomes apparent when time is of the
essence and other remedies that might cure the situation are not
238. J. Nicholas Kendall, Recent Development: Israeli Counter-Terrorism: "Targeted
Killings" Under International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1081 (2002) (citing YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 244 (2d ed. 1994)).
239. ERICKSON, supra note 61, at 144.
240. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 647.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 648.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 648.
247. ERICKSON, supra note 61, at 145.
248. Id. at 1. Lt. Col. Erickson is also a Research Fellow with the Airpower Research
Institute. Lt. Col. Erickson was the "Winner of the Air Force Historical Foundation's
1987 Colonel James Cannell Memorial Award." Id.
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available.149 "In targeting an individual, necessity would ask: What
will the death of this individual accomplish?"50  The answer
determines the legality of the action."' Abraham D. Sofaer, the
former Legal Advisor at the U.S. Department of State, 252 concludes
the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States
viewed necessity too restrictively. 5 3 The Nicaragua Court stated "it
was possible to eliminate the main danger to the Salvadorian
Government without the United States embarking on activities in and
against Nicaragua. Accordingly, it cannot be held that these activities
were undertaken in the light of necessity.,
254
3. Self-defense Requirement of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality consists of two requirements 25
The response of self-defense must be in proportion to the armed
216
attack, and the response must be proportional to the force used to
accomplish the goal.25 7 The targeting of leaders of terrorism, without
whom the terrorist organization could not function, appears to meet
requirements of proportionality.5 8  When considering the
proportionality of self-defense, the operation undertaken should
correspond to removing the danger. 2 9 Any action outside this barrier
amounts to reprisal and not self-defense. 26° The difference between
self-defense and reprisal is self-defense constitutes methods employed
to protect state security, while reprisals are vindictive or vengeful.2 1
The Nicaragua Court addressed proportionality by stating mining
harbors and attacking oil fields by the United States was not
proportional, and the help to the Contras lasted longer than the
212threat from Nicaragua existed. Sofaer argues the Court should not
249. Id. at 145.
250. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 640-41.
251. Id. at 641.
252. Harder, supra note 10, at 89.
253. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 97.
254. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
255. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 641.
256. ERICKSON, supra note 61, at 146.
257. Id.
258. Johnson, supra note 211, at 163.
259. ERICKSON, supra note 61, at 146.
260. Id.
261. Kendall, supra note 238, at 1082.
262.Sofaer, supra note 71, at 97 (construing Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)).
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require states to withhold the use of self-defense based on a belief
that the aggressor state will not attack again, if the state still retains
the ability to continue aggression.26 He concludes the military
strategists of a targeted state are in a better position to make such
delicate decisions in response to an attack or threat of attack on its
264territorial integrity or its citizens.
The restrictions of necessity and proportionality on the use of
force by a state are long-practiced concepts, and are thought to
facilitate a more constrained response. 5  Sofaer concludes that
adherence to these two elements are undermined if states are
required to expose themselves to a substantial threat of attack before
being able to respond. 2m He states that the Nicaragua Court viewed
necessity and proportionality too restrictively when holding that the
actions taken by the United States were too remote in time and
267
unnecessary.
4. Attempts to Codify Customary International Law
The American Civil War produced the first attempt by Dr.
Francis Lieber to codify customary international law in regards to the
prohibition on assassination. Lieber's work was reviewed by United
States military leaders and subsequently declared as General Order
100 in 1863. 2' 9  The "Lieber Code" firmly stated the illegality of
assassination:
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual
belonging to a hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile
Whatever uncertainty may have existed as to the exact scale of the
aid received by the Salvadorian armed opposition from Nicaragua, it
is clear that these latter United States activities in question could
not have been proportionate to that aid. Finally on this point, the
Court must also observe that the reaction of the United States in the
context of what it regarded as self-defense was continued long after
the period in which any presumed armed attack by Nicaragua could
reasonably be contemplated.
Military and Parliamentary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 122-23
(June 27).
263. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 97.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 97-98.
267. Id. at 97.
268. Zengel, supra note 22, at 130.
269. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 628-29.
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government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any
captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such
international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage.
The sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in
consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority.
Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the
assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.27 0
Lieber echoed the thoughts of the early scholars commenting on
assassination, directing his distaste of assassination and outlawry,
but not against legitimate operations by a state in armed conflict.
2 1
The Lieber Code was a catalyst for The Hague Convention of 1907272
which expressly declares the relationship between assassination and
treachery during armed conflict. Article 23(b) provides "it is
especially forbidden.., to kill or wound treacherously, individuals




C. The United Nations Charter
In 1945, the United Nations was formed. Upon ratification of the
Charter of the United Nations, the member states agreed the Charter
was international law.27 ' The United Nations Charter is recognized as
the most important example of international law with respect to the
use of force.276 Article 103 of the Charter preempts all other member
states' international obligations. 2 7' A rule emanating from customary
international law is adopted in Article 33 which states, "in the
settlement of any dispute which may threaten world peace and
security, an attempt must first be made to resolve the dispute by
270. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD (1863), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 21 (Dietrich
Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1981) [hereinafter THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS].
271. Wingfield, supra note 36, at 303.
272. Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, Introductory Note to FRANCIS LIEBER,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD in
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 270, at 3.
273. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 630.
274. The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 270, at 76.
275. Harder, supra note 10, at 10.
276. Pickard, supra note 7, at 11.
277. Id. "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."
U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
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,,218peaceful means. The Charter was designed by member nations as
an instrument of law that would be helpful in preventing war, not just
governing the conduct of wars.2'9  The Charter, to facilitate its
objective, states in Article 2, paragraph 4: "All members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."2 0 This article not only applies to members of the United
Nations, but also applies to states that are not members through
customary international law.281
1. Discussion of Article 2, paragraph 4
Article 2, paragraph 4 appears to be straight forward, but is
actually extremely intricate.8 2  Several issues arise as to its
interpretation. If a state facilitates or allows terrorists within its
borders to use force on other nations, are these hostilities a use of
force by the state in violation of the Article?8 3 May a state take action
which exceeds a response to force, such as the use of force for self-
help?284 Should the Charter, specifically Article 2, paragraph 4, be
reinterpreted to allow states to enforce their international rights due
to the failure of the United Nations to do so?285 Erickson believes that
misinterpreting the Charter is not the correct approach. If problems
arise over the proper interpretation, the member states should
renegotiate the terms of the document.286
2. Discussion of Article 51
Article 2 paragraph 4 and Article 51 codify the customary law
2817
right of self-defense. Article 51 allows states to use force within
278. Gross, supra note 208, at 208-09. "The Parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice." U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
279. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 645.
280. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
281. Gross, supra note 208, at 213.
282. ERICKSON, supra note 61, at 112.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 113.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 114.
287. Pickard, supra note 7, at 13.
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another foreign state if such force is not precluded by Article 2,
paragraph 4.298 The Charter's Article 2, paragraph 4 and Article 2,
paragraph 7 proscribe the threat of force, while Article 51 allows for a
state's right to self-defense and provides an exception to the use of
force when the action is justified although usually illegal."9 Article 51
states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peact
and security."290 The controversy in targeting specific individuals in
self-defense occurs due to the uncertainty over the definition of self-
defense.' 9' There is a strong debate among scholars regarding
whether an actual attack must occur before a state may invoke the
right to self-defense provided by Article 5 1.292 Article 51 has divided
scholars into two positions, a restrictive view and a liberal view.
291
a. Restrictive View of Article 51
The proponents of the restrictive view hold the belief that the
Charter allows for the right of self-defense, but the language found in
Article 51, "if an armed attack occurs" restricts the right.294  This
narrow view is articulated by the International Court of Justice in
Nicaragua v. United States and seems to give some protection to
terrorists and their state sponsors for their attack on democracy.""
The court decided the claim of self-defense was not justified because
customary international law permits using force in self-defense
against an armed attack, and the court found that assisting rebels by
providing weapons, logistical, or other support was not an armed
attack.2"
b. Liberal View of Article 51
It is argued the United Nations did not consider the threat of
terrorism when the Charter was designed, but the threat is now more
288. ERICKSON, supra note 61, at 112.
289. Id. at 129-30.
290. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
291. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 646.
292. Pickard, supra note 7, at 20.
293. Kendall, supra note 238, at 1079.
294. Id.
295. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 90-91.
296. Id. at 93-94.
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serious to many nations than conventional international war.297 The
proponents of the liberal view read Article 51 as allowing states to use
force in self-defense in response to attacks or to threats of immediate
attack.29 Thus, under the liberal view, Article 51 will allow states to
act preemptively to thwart not only actual attacks but also threats of
an attack. These interpretations would allow a state to use force to
prevent an attack or deter other attacks against a terrorist
organization, if the attack has occurred or is soon to occur. 299 A state
that hosts terrorists may be seen as supporting an indirect act of
aggression. Thus, under Article 51, the attack does not need to be
direct aggression; the indirect support itself may be regarded as an
armed attack. 00 Thus, threats of future attacks by terrorists who find
support and protection in other states should give rise to the situation
of self-defense.30 1
The use of anticipatory self-defense is a very important concept in
that it poses a deterrent to aggressors.0 2 Louis R. Beres, a Professor
of Political Science and International Law, 3 states international law
should not restrain a state to wait until an attack occurs before using
force to protect itself, especially when rogue nations possess the
ability to use nuclear weapons and not striking first might amount to
304destruction. The argument furthered by Beres, allowing for the use
of anticipatory self-defense, seems to be the predominant view among
scholars.0 5  Sir Humphrey Waldock, former President of the
International Court of Justice, stated it would be against the purpose
of the Charter to force a state to idly wait for an aggressor to strike
first and wound the targeted state, arguing that allowing this would
foster the aggressor's right to strike first.30 6 Beres argues Article 51
does not require an armed attack in regards to a state-sponsored
activity; thus, he concludes terrorist attacks are parallel to attacks by
a state for the purposes of self-defense.3 0 7 He states that this applies
297. O'Brien, supra note 210, at 198.
298. Kendall, supra note 238, at 1079-80.
299. Id.
300. Gross, supra note 208, at 215.
301. Id. at 219.
302. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 646.
303. Beres, supra note 78, at 231 n.1.
304. Id. at 239.
305. ERICKSON, supra note 61, at 138.
306. Id. at 143.
307. Beres, supra note 78, at 243.
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when a state fails to end terrorist activities initiated in its borders
against another state.08
3. International Community's Failure to Condemn Assassination
The strategy of self-defense has generally been successful in
practice for Israel; however, Israel's practice of self-defense has been
criticized by the world and the United Nations.3"9 On April 16, 1988,
Israeli commandos stormed into the home of Abu Jihad, the head of
military strategy for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),S• 310
and murdered the leader, leaving his family uninjured. It was
believed that Jihad was involved in the planning of several terrorist
strikes against Israel.311 The team that entered Jihad's compound in
Tunis did not wear insignias and covered their faces with masks. No
312
nation or organization claimed responsibility for the assassination.
The international community believes Israel perpetrated the murder
of Abu Jihad.31' Tunisia sought condemnation by the United Nations
Security Council for Israel's violation of its sovereignty and territorial
integrity.314 The United States representative abstained, and the
Security Council condemned the action. The resolution did not focus
on the assassination, but rather it concentrated on the violation of
Tunisia's sovereignty and territorial integrity under international
law. 315
The Council was not limited to the sovereignty and territorial
debate in its resolution, and conspicuously did not comment
specifically on the uneasy question of state-sponsored assassination. 16
The United Nations' failure to condemn the assassination is arguably
because some states support the PLO and their use of assassination,
and other states have been involved in assassination attempts; thus
to condemn assassination would amount to publicly denouncing an act
they might consider using in the future as foreign policy.3 1 7 The
failure of the Council to directly confront and condemn the
308. Id.
309. O'Brien, supra note 210, at 197.
310. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 121.
311. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 626 (citing Dan Fischer & John M. Brodie, Value of
Israel's Assassination Policy Debated, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1988, at 1).
312. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 121.
313. Id.
314. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 626.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 627.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
assassination further proves the debate on the practice of
assassination in international law.315
D. United States and Self-Defense
The United States does not adhere to the belief that the United
Nations Charter usurps customary international law with respect to
the right of a state to practice self-defense. 319 The United States
construes Article 51 as allowing for three types of self-defense: "1.
[s]elf-defense in the face of the real use of force or hostile actions; 2.
[sielf-defense as a preventive action in the face of immediate activities
where it is anticipated that force will be used; 3. [s]elf-defense in the
face of a persistent threat."2 The United States interprets the
concept of "armed attack" as harmonious with the customary practice
that allows a state to protect its integrity and citizens from illegal
force directed at a state.2 1
1. Example of Self-Defense by the United States
One argument posits the purpose of the 1986 raid on Libya was to
kill Colonel Qadhafi and should qualify as an assassination
attempt.3 22  The attack on Libya was conducted in response to a
bombing of a Berlin disco, which resulted in the deaths of three
Americans and injured fifty others.3 23 The raid attacked five different
military targets used for the support and training of terrorists, and
thus the United States claimed the attack was a legitimate military
operation.324 The operation did not become illegitimate because one of
the targets in the raid was a residence of Qadhafi.325 Qadhafi was not
personally exempt from the risks involved in a legitimate attack.
26
"He was and is personally responsible for Libya's policy of training,
318. Id.
319. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 94.
320. Gross, supra note 208, at 217.
321. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 94.
322. Id. at 119.
323. Gross, supra note 208, at 240.
324. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 119-20. President Reagan in a letter addressed to
Congress stated, that the strikes against Libya were within the right granted under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The President further stated that though
the strike was preemptive and it was directed against terrorist activity. President
Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya
(Apr. 14, 1986).
325. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 120.
326. Id.
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assisting, and utilizing terrorists in attacks on United States citizens,
diplomats, troops, and facilities. His position as head of state
provided him no legal immunity from being attacked when present at
a proper military target.2 27 If an official is involved in an action
against another nation that allows for self-defense, the official may
become a lawful target, thus the law of armed conflict may be
applied. 28
2. Burden of Proof
However, interpreting the concept of anticipatory self-defense too
broadly will inevitably lead to abuse.3 ' 9  Article 2 paragraph 3
provides states should peacefully settle international conflicts so that
peace and security are upheld.330 Thus, before employing the use of
assassination as a method of anticipatory self-defense, a state would
need to make an impressive showing that it attempted to settle the
matter peacefully. 3 Establishing responsibility for terrorist's acts
are a problem of proof.33 Terrorists often do not accept responsibility
33for their acts, and states that sponsor terrorism have an even
greater reason to avoid responsibility. 4
The questions surrounding the rules that govern state-sponsored
terrorism need to be answered.3 5 State-sponsored terrorism is often
more dangerous than individual acts because states have the
resources to allow terrorists to cause greater loss of life and damage.3 6
The International Court of Justice has allowed states assisting
terrorists to evade responsibility for the group's conduct in its decision
in Nicaragua v. United States.3 " The court found that United States'
327. Id.
328. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 668.
329. Beres, supra note 78, at 239.
330. ERICKSON, supra note 61, at 144. "All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security,
and justice, are not endangered." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
331. Beres, supra note 78, at 239.
332. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 98.
333. Id. at 100.
334. Id. at 98.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 101.
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support for the Contras was significant, but not enough to hold the
United States liable since the Contras were independent.338
Differences in the degree of proof of actual approval by a State
of specific terrorist acts should operate to vary the degree of
responsibility and the remedies imposed, rather than to
permit a State to exploit the high standard of proof that
should govern in determining the propriety of resorting to self-
defense. 9
When evaluating a threat to a state, the interpretation of a signal
of attack should be left to intelligence experts.340 Four factors help in
determining the reasonableness of a perceived threat: past practices,
motives, current context, and preparatory actions.3 4'
338. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 101. The United States was only held responsible for
the mining of harbors, and not for the financing of military training, tactical
assistance, arms, food, and clothing. Id.
339. Id. at 105.
340. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 648-49.
341. Id. at 649.
Past Practices: Past practices of the terrorist organization must be
reviewed to determine the extent to which a possible attack is
consistent with those practices. Does a pause usually occur between
attacks? If so, the fact that a prior attack has not recently occurred
will not indicate that terrorist activities have stopped. On the other
hand, if the particular group has been engaged in a nearly
continuous stream of violence, a lull in that violence argues against
the reasonableness of a preemptive strike.
Motives: Does the group have articulated goals? If so, then the
extent to which those goals have or have not been fulfilled will bear
on the likelihood of future attacks. To what extent does the group
have goals suggesting a long-term conflict with the target state?
Current Context: Have contemporary events caused tension between
the state and the terrorists to become exacerbated or relaxed?
Similarly, what is the current state of relations between the target
state and those nations sponsoring the terrorist group? Further, to
what extent is the target state currently vulnerable from either a
security or political perspective?
Preparatory Actions: Even though no intelligence is available
indicating a planned attack, are activities underway that suggest
that an operation is being planned? For example, has the group
recently received weapons, made contact with sponsors, or dispersed
its operatives? The more consistent the particular activities that the
group conducts are with prior operations, the more likely a response
is to be deemed reasonable. Id.
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Although international law has traditionally prohibited
assassination, during the last two centuries the targeting of specific• . 342
individuals has been permitted. This change may apply if no good
faith obligation is owed to the target. If the targeting does not involve
treachery, then the prohibition on assassination would not apply.343
The permissibility of assassinating a leader supporting terrorists is
contingent on whether the supporting state violates Article 2,S 344
paragraph 4 by state-sponsored assistance. Because of the
devastating results of the use of weapons of mass destruction, the use
of anticipatory self-defense enhances the legitimate possibility of the
use of assassination as a preemptive measure. 345 There are several
guidelines to follow in allowing the use of assassination as a
preemptive measure to aggression: first, a state must make a bona
fide effort to identify specific targets in authority in the aggressor
state;346 second, the assassination must adhere to the standards of
discrimination, proportionality, and necessity; third, intelligence must
be gathered and it must be shown that the aggressor state was
preparing for conventional or unconventional attack on the
responding state; and finally, the responding state must conclude the
assassination will prevent the aggression and will result in fewer
casualties than other methods of a forceful response.347
V. ISSUES AND PROBLEMS OF ASSASSINATION
The United States should not use the military or special forces to
murder (or assassinate) for the advancement of the nation's national
• , , 348
interests. The limitation on assassination creates a disadvantage
for the United States when confronted by nations or organizations
that choose to murder citizens in order to further their political
objectives; this is a disadvantage that the United States should be
willing to accept.349 In contrast, the United States should not allow
the erroneous use of the prohibition on assassination to frustrate a
rightful use of force in defending its citizens and allies.5 0  When
342. Pickard, supra note 7, at 18.
343. Id.
344. Beres, supra note 78, at 247.
345. Id. at 240.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Sofaer, supra note 71, at 117.
349. Id.
350. Id.
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examining the practice of assassination of foreign leaders who support
and allow terrorists to operate within their borders, two issues arise:
morality and practicality."'
A. Morality and United States Beliefs of Assassination
One possible argument for not practicing assassination by a state
is the biblical commandment, "thou shall not kill."352 However, this
prevents self-defense, which allows for a killing when defending
oneself when in imminent danger of serious harm.' 3 The problem in
the international arena is that there is no powerful body or
organization enforcing the rights of nations against terrorists and
states providing terrorists a safe haven.354 The issue presented is
whether assassination is morally acceptable because of the failure of
the international community to provide legal recourse for terrorism.35
The proponents of assassination advance the argument that
assassination prevents a greater evil. This argument is best
illustrated by the claim that an assassination of Hitler before World
War II would have saved millions of lives in the war and the
Holocaust; however, critics argue the example is studied in
hindsight.35 6 The argument of preventing a greater evil is persuasive
when applied to the context of killing a leader who supports terrorists,
whose acts may result in the death of hundreds or thousands of
innocent civilians, or high casualties suffered when a nation takes
military action.357
Opponents of assassination assert that its use does not serve the
interests of the United States because it creates a chaotic community
of leaderless states.3 58 Assassination might also harm United States
citizens when they question the ruthless tactics of assassination
employed by their government.359 The predominant reason for not
using assassination is that selectively killing individuals does not
relate to "who and what the people of the United States are.3 60 When
the United States assassinates individuals before they stand trial and





356. Pickard, supra note 7, at 32.
357. Id.
358. NUTTER, supra note 28, at 134.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 146.
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hides to avoid responsibility, there is no difference between the
United States and the terrorists.3 1 By participating in assassination,
a government places itself on a slippery slope. 362 If the assassination
of one leader is acceptable, then the assassinations of other leaders
are tolerated, and if assassination is not condemned, then any
troublesome individual may be subject to assassination by the United
363States .
B. Impracticality of Assassination
If the killing of an individual to save the lives of many others is
morally justified, the argument does not mandate that the United
States should use assassination as a foreign policy against leaders
who facilitate terrorism. 64 Although schemes may be developed to
carry out an assassination, the scenario might still suffer from a risk
165
of failure. s Several practical objections may also be argued against
the use of assassination: feasibility, world condemnation, and the
possibility that the assassination might backfire, accomplish little, or
• • 366
result in retaliation.
Superficially, historical events seem to be determined by
individual leaders, but this discounts "political, economic, social, and
cultural dynamics that influence the directions that nations and
governments pursue."3 67 Dictators, although usually thought of as
independent rulers, have a responsibility to an elite class or military
leadership for their power.368 Thus, simply removing and replacing
the leader does not necessarily change the direction of the system
because political, economic, social, and cultural dynamics not only
provide authority to leaders, but also wield power over them.36 9 When
evaluating assassination as a method of removing a leader, three
questions must be answered: "Who is likely to replace the
assassinated leader? Will this person adopt a more favorable policy?
361. Id. A list of several governments using assassination as a policy tool: " Iran,
Iraq, Libya, the [former] Soviet Union, Chile under Pinochet, Argentina, Guatemala,
and Israel." Id.
362. Id. at 147.
363. See NUTTER, supra note 28, 147.
364. RICHELSON, supra note 82, at 465.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 465-66.
367. NUTTER, supra note 28, at 135.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 137.
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Can this person adopt a more favorable policy?"3 0  If a nation
questioning the use of assassination cannot be sure that a new leader
would be better, there is risk that another leader more hostile to the
United States may assume power.3 1 State-sanctioned assassinations
are difficult to keep secret because operations consist of not only the
killing, but also involve replacing a regime, which is usually made
372public through overt acts. After the assassination of a dictator, the
subsequent power vacuum may be filled by further violence unless a
regime replacement plan is in place.
37 3
The end goal of assassination is not the targeted killing, but
rather the change in the regime or its practices; without a regime
374
change it will be difficult to determine if the killing was a success.
Determining whether the assassination was successful requires two
conditions: the first is tactical, in which the leader has been
eliminated; and the second is strategic, in which a change in policy
has been enacted. Because of the many risks inherent in the use of
assassination, the United States would rarely benefit from employing
assassination.376 Another problem with the use of assassination is
that United States leaders are more exposed to possible retaliations
because of the open nature of a democracy.
3 7
Assassination is not, and should not, be a preferred tactic by the
United States. When an international dispute arises, the United
States may use economic, financial, technological, and military power
over other states; resorting to assassination is a tactic that weaker
nations tend to choose to use in furtherance of state goals.7
Furthermore, if the killing itself or installation of a pro-U.S. leader
fails, the reaction by the target state could result in increased
terrorism, a reciprocal assassination attempt, or a justification for
other nations to engage in such conduct.3 79 As the dominant nation in
the world, the United States should seek to create international
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other nations to adhere to its example."" Among the goals achieved
by the United States in following a policy prohibiting assassination
are: (1) foreign nations would not be able to argue their use of
assassination is allowed because the United States practices such
conduct, and (2) the United States gains the advantage of moral
outrage, thus aligning it with other nations in the world that condemn
assassination.381
IV. CONCLUSION
The world now knows that a well-funded terrorist organization
causes terrible destruction and loss of human life. Few will argue
that those responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001 deserved
to be killed. Targeting those responsible for the attacks against the
United States becomes further complicated if nations are found to
support terrorism. Some nations have not only verbally supported
such acts of terror, but have also provided state support of these
organizations and the destruction they cause.
In response to the recent acts of terrorists, the employment of
assassination against terrorists and state leaders who sponsor
terrorism has become a topic of debate. Examining Executive Order
12,333 reveals some confusion as to whether assassination is
prohibited under domestic law.38 2 The purpose of the Order was to
end the unilateral actions by individuals and agencies of the United
States Government and declare that assassination should not be used
to further United States foreign policy.38  The Order was not designed
to limit lawful self-defense against threats to national security.38 4 The
best approach to determine whether assassination is prohibited under
domestic law is "to rescind the current executive order and issue a
new, more comprehensive one that precisely delineates the
boundaries of permissibility.
' 8 5
The issue of assassination in international law is even more
uncertain. The nature of armed conflict has changed to allow an
individual or an organization to cause great destruction. 3' 6 The ability
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to cause overwhelming loss of life is increased if states provide
support to terrorists. International law allows for the use of self-
defense; however, when this right applies is debatable. It is difficult
to believe that international law would prohibit the killing of an
individual who is willing to further national goals at the expense of
hundreds or thousands of innocent civilians. A state, following the
self-defense requirements of imminence, necessity, and
proportionality, would presumably give the response legitimacy.
Should the United States employ the use of assassination of a
foreign leader who supports terrorism? This question may provide
different answers depending on the many variables of the situation to
be considered. Terrorism and state support of terrorists will continue
to be a threat to the world, and questions concerning the parameters
of the response to the threat need to be answered. This an issue that
requires further debate by scholars, the elected leaders of the United
States, and the world.
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